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1 INTRODUCTION
People and governments in many aid-receiving
countries are seeking better government and more
pluralist societies. Aid donors have made this their
concern. I have discussed the current interest in 'better
government' with officials, politicians and academics of
several recipient countries and representatives of the
private sector and donor organizations. Some I met on
visits to Africa and Asia. Many spoke in confidence
about why they think the subject has attracted such
attention, about what might be done, about successes
and failures. I am indebted to them all.
2 POLICIES
The desire to govern well is shown by many efforts at
electoral or judicial or public sector reform. Politicians
hope in such ways to win support and legitimacy for
government. For all our countries 'better government'
begins at home. But calls for better government in
aid-receiving countries became more strident from
1989 onwards, making this a major issue on the
development agenda.
2.1 Calls for better government
What was wanted? Improvements were sought in every
part of central government - the political leadership,
legislature, public service, judiciary, police, security
and defence - and in local government. In a key study,
staff of the World Bank (1989) gave currency to the
term 'governance', defined in this context as 'the
exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs'.
In public pronouncements, heads of state and others
explained what they thought necessary. (See '.
Milestones . . .' in this Bulletin.) Themes mentioned
many times are listed below, grouped to suggest the
major concerns:
social justice
respect for human rights
independent judiciary
freedom of speech and press;
economic liberalism
protection of private property
encouragement of private investment
search for greater equity;
political pluralism
participation
decentralization
democracy;
administrative accountability
transparency
reduced corruption
increased efficiency.
With so many objectives the words were more like
clarion calls than an agenda for change. There are
potential conflicts and in different contexts there would
be more priority, for example, to improving equity or
investment incentives.
Two major requirements were increased participation
by the people and increased accountability by
government. One feeds the other. Participation meant
people having 'voice', made effective partly through
systems for consultation and representation, that
brought more responsibility and 'empowerment'.
Accountability was required of government as a whole
- judges and politicians as much as officials - to curb
corruption and incompetence. Accountability was
sought through competition. For this it was thought
necessary to break the monopolies of government
control of the press and media, of state enterprises, of
one-party systems and of public services (by
contracting out). There were calls for less government
but also demands for more action by governments on
issues of international concern: the environment,
migration, drugs, and terrorism. More recently there
have been increasing demands for governments to
provide a framework for society that would encourage
pluralism but prevent exploitation of people or the
environment.
Better government is both a means of development and
a development objective, bringing better quality of life.
It follows earlier fashions - basic needs, integrated
rural development, structural adjustment - as a stage
in learning about development. The concern for better
government shows the tensions between the develop-
ment goals of economic growth, social participation
and political stability that reflect personal ambitions for
wealth, power and safety. Progress towards one goal
may need to be traded against another. Some expect a
widespread return to authoritarian systems if protection
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of human rights and the espousal of democracy is
followed by slowed economic growth or the violent
disintegratiçn of society. But for now many citizens of
countries receiving aid prefer a voice in their affairs and
justice in the way they are treated to an uncertain share
in economic growth or to stable but repressive
government.
2.2 Causes of discontent
A growing discontent with government in aid-recipient
countries may be attributed to several causes acting
together:
education for more people raises expectations;
information is more readily available through new
technologies;
development failures bring disillusion, with 'Dey-
plans' a subject of ridicule and mistrust;
economic recession hurts, especially where popu-
lations are increasing;
excessive bureaucracy provokes resentment through
demands for licences and permits for everything in
'permitsive' societies;
corruption makes people angry, especially where it
creates a rich élite from which others feel excluded;
over-centralized power brings blame on governments
from a generation that cannot accept that all failures are
the fault of the colonialists.
These cumulative changes served within many
countries as a fuel that external factors could ignite.
Two of these external factors were:
news of change elsewhere, especially from Central
and Eastern Europe where some had imagined that
governments were strong and stable;
the concerns of the donors about human rights,
equity, and proper use of funds.
External causes served as sparks to light a fire;
criticisms of government arise mainly from people's
experience within their own societies. Discontent with
government is less marked in countries - for example
in South East Asia - which have enjoyed continued
economic growth and kept corruption within bounds.
In these countries there is irritation about the
importance attached by donors to good governance;
but there is at the same time a local commitment to
many of the characteristics of good government.
The motivations for donor interest in better
government are (a) the concern in donor constituencies
about human rights; (b) the accountability of aid
agencies for the proper use of aid; and (c) the increasing
concern of governments about global issues of
terrorism, drugs and the environment. Donor interest
in 'good governance' is controversial, being understood
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as advocacy for one universal pattern of government. In
countries that have adversarial politics the phrase is
welcome to the opposition but constitutes a challenge
to the party in power. The term 'better government' is
less confrontational because it implies improving
patterns of government which may differ in some
respects in different cultures. The government and
development debate requires a consensus on respect for
individual human rights, on the rights of participation
for all, women and men, and on the need to restrain and
hold accountable any collective human authority.
Given that consensus, 'better government' is a goal that
all may share.
2.3 The challenge to corruption
Corruption merits special consideration because those
who benefit from it see the quest for better government
as a threat. The idea that corruption promotes
economic development is false because of the
distortions caused when corrupt officials seek to
maximize their income (Alam 1990). Arguments that
excuse corruption as an adaptation of local custom are
untenable. High-level corruption owes more to the
culture of unrestrained big business and specially
private or state sector monopolies than to the customs
of family and village. It operates with a secrecy and on a
scale out of keeping with most traditions.
Corruption is politically destabilizing, especially when
it is practised on such a scale that it impoverishes
others, retards development and creates a closed circle
for the very rich. Successful reductions in levels of
corruption have been attributed by officials to the
determination of the political leadership. Public anger
may lead politicians to recognize that their popularity
- and safety - depend on effective action against
corruption.
Agencies to fight corruption have three main tasks. The
first is operational: to find evidence of corruption and
have people charged. Warnings for those suspected
have been found very effective where backed by media
coverage of trials and convictions for corruption. The
second task is prevention: examining and changing
rules and procedures to minimize opportunities for
corrupt practice. Scott, Carstairs and Roots (1988)
report that one agency found prevention more cost-
effective than investigation and prosecution in
reducing corruption. The third task is public
persuasion or community relations: using the mass
media, and information packs for schools, to warn
against the consequences of corrupt practice and to
encourage people to report it.
In some countries it is an offence for public servants to
enjoy a standard of living higher than could be
sustained by their official salary or to have more money
than they could have earned without explanation to the
courts. The penalty is dismissal. Some think this in
breach of human rights by its apparent presumption of
guilt. However a code of practice for the public sector
could make an appropriate lifestyle and the declaration
of assets a condition of employment. Where public
sector pay has fallen to such low levels that public
servants have to rely on other earnings, new codes of
practice may need to be phased in with public sector
reform and new rates of pay.
In several countries there is despair about ever
reducing corruption. Experience suggests that action
can be highly effective if backed by political
determination. When an Independent Commission
Against Corruption was established in Hong Kong,
doubts were expressed about its possible effectiveness
because 'graft was a way of life'. The Commission
claims that this was proved wrong.
3 PROGRAMMES
Who can make the changes that will bring better
government?
First governments - by reforming their structures as
they hear the concerns of the people and learn of
changes elsewhere. This requires hard-pressed
politicians and over-burdened top officials to make
extra efforts.
Second the people - by voicing their views.
Third aid donors - by efforts to ensure that aid is
effective and matches the intentions of their own
constituencies. As a member of that donor constituency
I focus attention here on action by donors while
recognizing that responsibility lies primarily with
peoples and governments in their own countries.
Donors start with dialogue: ideally trying to
understand the problem in different countries and to
help governments recognize what needs to be done.
Dialogue includes efforts to convince and persuade.
Figure 1 shows the other choices before donors seeking
to use aid to promote better government.
3.1 Aid conditions
Conditionality means refusing or threatening to refuse
aid. Some donors are constrained by their constituencies
or mandates to cease giving aid if they think it will do
more harm than good - by bolstering a corrupt or
tyrannical government for example. Donors have cut
aid to governments which have failed to protect human
rights or implement economic reforms. Nelson and
Eglinton (1992) argue that conditioned aid may help
improve economic governance and respect for human
rights but be less effective with respect to competitive
democracy. Democracy imposed from outside is hardly
democracy. But donor support for better government
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Figure 1: Choices for Donors
DONOR
NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Conditionality Action
HOW? WHAT?
goes further than 'political conditionality' or deciding
when to cut off aid to the wicked.
3.2 Aid management
The management of aid programmes is part of good or
bad government. Donors may promote accountability
by giving account to the intended beneficiaries as well
as their own treasuries. Donors may foster participation
by consulting end users when preparing and
implementing projects, giving them a voice and a sense
of ownership. Much is done already. More might be
done, but the benefits of consultation have to be set
against the difficulties and cost of increased management
for both donor and recipient.
Aid needs to match the increasing importance of social
and political goals for national development. Healey
and Robinson (1992) show that economic policies and
performance appear uncorrelated with patterns of
democratic or authoritarian government. The British
Overseas Aid Act (1966, Ch. 21) authorizes assistance
to promote development and welfare. Some donors
may need to re-examine their mandates where these
specify economic growth as the only criterion for aid.
Projects directed at social and political goals merit
support in their own right and not only if it can be
argued that they will promote conditions that favour
economic growth.
This leads to problems with project appraisal.
Sometimes social benefits are described as 'intangible'
AID PROJECTS
MANAGEMENT FOR
GOVERNMENT SOCIETY
but a valuation is implicit in choosing whether to fund a
dam, a dispensary or a local newspaper. A more
transparent approach would assign values directly to
the benefits, even if somewhat arbitrarily. If the letters
pages of a newspaper make officials and politicians
more accountable, that accountability should bring a
marginally better use of funds. The benefit might be
worth one per cent of the cost of government services.
A project to retrain soldiers for return to civilian life
might be thought to reduce the probability of
revolution by 10 per cent and that benefit to be worth
three months' National Product, or more. The
difficulties in assigning values or ranges of values to
social and political benefits are timely reminders that
estimates of economic benefit also depend on social and
political suppositions (including the improbability of
bloody revolution). To quantify is not economistic but
a recognition that we judge one project 'more'
worthwhile than another for social and political
benefits as well as economic.
Aid may strengthen the very monopolies that donors
wish to help avoid if donor enthusiasm for institutional
development leads to support for one organization,
putting competitors out of business. Donors have
argued that duplication is wasteful but without
duplication there is no competition. Donors may
reduce the risk of unwitting support for monopolies by
supporting demand rather than supply. Thus funds for
public sector training could be given to ministries to
buy training where they will. This would bring a
market discipline to training organizations and the
courses they offer. It would encourage personnel
managers to identify priorities for their training
budgets rather than take whatever training is available
because it is free.
4 PROJECTS
Aid donors fund some projects directly intended to
help governments to govern well. Donors help with
public sector reform and with parliamentary and local
government administration and with election
monitoring. Much donor support is in the form of
training, consultancies, seminars and equipment aimed
at institutional development.
The choice of new projects for donor support needs
itself to be an exercise in better government. Guiding
principles include: devolution to those familiar with
local conditions; consultation with end users;
ascertaining any conditions necessary if the project is to
succeed; simplicity of design with a few clear
objectives. More strategically, donors and recipients
need to identify together where donor assistance might
have an advantage (bringing in 'outsiders', for example,
for audits or action against corruption).
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Aid to support pluralism will be 'pluralist', having
many small seemingly independent parts - training,
equipment, consultancies, seminars - directed to
many different parts of government and society. Large
numbers of small projects pose difficulties for
management. Management problems for donors are
compounded by ignorance of local conditions and
culture; management tasks for recipients include
security and a need to monitor donors and voluntary
agencies each having their own constituencies and
agenda.
5 A PROJECT PORTFOLIO
Examples of projects to help governments govern or to
strengthen civil society are given here as a 'Portfolio'.
They have been chosen because they were thought
valuable in the countries I visited, or have novel
features. I have omitted some of the projects that many
donors support already. Objectives are italicized.
The political leadership
1 National briefing seminars would give information
about issues facing the country, strengthen relationships
between different groups of people, and develop positive
attitudes towards accountability in public and private
sectors. Short residential seminars for ministers
together with senior officials and private sector
representatives could discuss papers given by national
experts on the economy, social issues, law and order.
Donors might facilitate but should not dominate such
events. Similar briefing seminars might be held for
newly elected members of parliament and local
councils.
Donors may be exposed to the charge that there has
been much talk about better government and little
action. To some extent that charge must be rebutted.
Talk has value in showing the need for better
government and helping change attitudes, and in many
places more talk is needed at the local and national
level.
Participation by the people
2 Local radio programmes could provide information
and give voice to people 's concerns. A suitable pattern
might be similar to 'phone-in' programmes but with
roving reporters recording people's views and
questions for broadcast together with the responses of
professionals, officials and elected representatives.
Themes such as health care or legal rights would bring
free professional advice to listeners. Broadcasts focused
on central or local government services, the activities of
the private sector or voluntary agencies would hold
officials, elected representatives and managers account-
able by asking them to respond.
Donor funding for an expatriate adviser and equipment
could help set up the project and give it political clout.
A pilot project providing one hour a week of peak time
broadcasting plus repeats on an existing radio station
could cover a rural area or suburb with say 500,000
people. One measure of success would be the time
people spent listening together with an average value
attached to their time. Another would be the number of
officials and others called to give account for policies
and actions, or to give professional advice. Local
programmes rather than national would focus attention
on people's more immediate needs. Community radio
projects in Peru and elsewhere offer a partial precedent
but with less professional content than proposed here.
3 Local newspaper projects are an alternative.
Support for several papers would encourage competition
of views and prices. This may be sought by subsidizing
distribution rather than production, or giving people
vouchers to buy papers of their choice which would be
cashed by the sellers, thus supporting demand rather
than supply. In areas where only one newspaper is
thought viable the publishers could be offered training
and equipment on condition that 'letters' pages
reflected diverse views.
The public sector
Donors have given substantial support to public sector
training for many years. More recently the emphasis
has been on public sector reform with institutional
changes that require new attitudes as well as new skills.
4 Work audits prepared individually or in groups
have as objectives developing attitudes and generating
proposals for change. Public servants, with help from a
consultant and their 'customers', would describe the
products of their work and estimate costs and benefits.
The costs are both those directly to government
(salaries, support staff, offices) and those indirectly to
the nation through diverted production (time spent
arranging licences, permits, etc.). Such audits lead to
questions about whether the benefits are worth the
costs and how costs may be reduced. Low cost small
scale studies should help change peoples' thinking
about their work.
5 Resource transfer projects could transfer people
and resources from the public to the private sector.
Features might be: final months of public sector
employment used for training; redundancy pay
providing start-up capital for work in farming, small
scale production or service sector; subsequent savings
in public sector salaries available to help fund further
transfers, making the project self-sustaining; savings
sufficient to allow also increases in public sector pay.
Public sector employees may adapt most readily to the
private sector ethos in those countries where public
servants have found it necessary to supplement their
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salaries by private work. The initial costs are high,
daunting for governments or donors, but have to be
met to lessen the risk of social unrest where public
sector reforms require redundancies. There are strong
arguments for similar support to reduce numbers of
military personnel and help their transfer to civilian
life.
Public sector numbers have been reduced in Ghana
and some other countries and there has been a
successful small scale scheme for retraining Gurkhas in
Nepal, but in many countries action on redundancies is
not taken because the political risk is thought
unacceptable.
Corruption
6 Action against corruption is a necessary part of
efforts to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Recipient
governments might welcome donor support to bring
outside advice. Possibilities for action include support
for the police and the law courts (perhaps with
incentives to report attempted bribes, as found
succcessful in Tanzania) and for the press (conditional
on its freedom to criticize). Donors might help
establish or strengthen a National Audit Office
(stressing the value of publicity for its findings), a
Public Accounts Committee, Ombudsmen or a Public
Complaints Bureau (as in Malaysia), an Inspector
General of the Public Service (as in Uganda), or an Anti
Corruption Agency. Separate anti-corruption agencies
have been found effective in Malaysia and Hong Kong.
Donors could also help with studies of structural and
management changes to reduce opportunities for
corruption, and with the preparation of legislation and
public service codes of practice.
Law and order
The protection of human rights requires fair trial,
better prison conditions and greater awareness of legal
rights and access to legal aid. Donors who support the
police and the courts have a special responsibility for
helping ensure that the right people are sentenced and
that treatment is humane.
7 Support for an independent judiciary could aim
to help judges resist political interference or other local
pressures. Donors could help meet the needs described
below.
Visible membership of the international legal
community, by attendance at international meetings,
helps judges have a sense of belonging and provides a
network for the exchange of views. This helps judges
when their work distances them from their family and
local legal community.
An exchange of judges between countries having
similar legal systems strengthens the resistance of
courts and judges to attempted interference.
Regional or sub-regional courts of appeal, perhaps
similar to the European Court, may also strengthen
judges from interference in their own countries.
Suggestions have been made (for example at a Judicial
Colloquium in Banjul in 1990). The initiative rests with
regional bodies.
Judges need security against arbitrary dismissal -
already guaranteed in many countries, but not all. This
could be a condition for any donor assistance to
maintain law and order. Without this, improved
policing and court administration might promote
injustice rather than justice.
8 Improvements for prisoners could have as
objectives providing more humane treatment, improved
conditions, and help with rehabilitation. This would
require visits by the family, arrangements for
independent prison visitors, training of guards, better
facilities, training trainers to help prisoner
rehabilitation. Donors would need to give support with
sufficient conditions for transparency and accountability
to satisfy themselves that help would not be misused.
9 Probation schemes could be funded to reduce
prison populations, lessen the risk of crimimalizing first
offenders and save government expenditure on prisons.
Countries that do not have such schemes may need
advice on legislation, police monitoring and the
establishment of a small probation service, and help
with training.
Civil society
Aid funds are available most readily for public sector
investment and for public sector training. Ways need to
be found to increase support for the private sector, both
for profit-making commercial operations and for
voluntary agencies. Such aid needs to be entre-
preneurial, less risk-averse than has been the wont of
some donors in the past.
10 Private sector support projects could have as
their objectives strengthening commercial and professional
bodies. They could include elements of training,
consultancy, advice on investment, provision of small
scale equipment (for example to professional
associations or chambers of commerce). Small scale
entrepreneurs might benefit from short periods of
training arranged locally or from short periods of
attachment to similar businesses overseas. Many
medium size businesses need advice with accounts.
The difficulties are of specification - requiring the
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recipient country's government to agree to a rather
broadly defined package - and management. The
approach needs to be entrepreneurial, with delegated
powers of decision (for example on who should be sent
for training), but with arrangements for spot checks to
guard against corruption.
Several donors have supported small enterprises. It is
easy to be discouraged by failures. There is a learning
curve, with the likelihood that repeated efforts and
failures will be needed before success is achieved. Aid
to private sector companies and organizations should
be conditional on the transparency and accountability
of their operations.
Similar support might be given to voluntary agencies.
In some countries the condition that they should act
with more transparency and accountability would be
very welcome.
Training
li Training projects need careful targeting in
periods of rapid change and reform, often as part of
larger projects aimed at change. The objectives need to
include the development of attitudes as well as skills;
encouraging commitment as well as competence. Donor
support for training has, in the past, concentrated on
the development of skills and the attainment of
academic qualifications needed for promotion. Some-
times the criteria for promotion are more academic in
recipient countries than in donor countries, perhaps in
search of an objectivity that checks nepotism, but an
emphasis on qualifications rather than job performance
in selecting people for promotion can be
counterproductive.
Success on the job depends on commitment as well as
competence, using categories developed for Europe by
Everwijn et al (1990). Attitudes are changed by
exposure to different ideas, for example from
participants with different backgrounds in short
international seminars. Work experience in a different
environment may also prove effective.
Improved skills are needed. But courses aimed at
developing skills might develop attitudes also with one
or two extra days for discussion of the wider issues in
seeking better government and more pluralist societies.
Public servants and private sector and voluntary
agency employees should see their work in the context
of demands for improved accountability and
participation.
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